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Essays on Labor Market Inequality
Conrad Miller
This thesis consists of three chapters on aspects of labor 
market inequality. Chapter 1 examines the dynamic effects of 
federal affirmative action regulation, exploiting variation in 
the timing of regulation and deregulation across work estab-
lishments. Chapter 2 studies the spatial mismatch hypothesis, 
which proposes that job suburbanization isolates blacks from 
work opportunities and depresses black employment. Chap-
ter 3, coauthored with Isaiah Andrews, analyzes the effect of 
heterogeneity on the widely used analyses of Baily (1978) 
and Chetty (2006) for optimal social insurance.
Chapter 1
The Persistent Effect of Temporary  
Affirmative Action
The first chapter analyzes the dynamic effects of tem-
porary federal affirmative action regulation. Affirmative 
action policies—those designed to increase diversity among 
employees, students, politicians, or businesses by advantag-
ing candidates from underrepresented social groups—are 
practiced throughout the world (Fryer and Loury 2013). They 
are universally controversial. Even among their advocates, 
they are often introduced or supported as only temporary 
remedies for existing social inequities (Sowell 2004). The 
hope is that a temporary affirmative action program that 
enhances diversity and reduces inequality between groups 
can persistently alter those outcomes.
Whether a temporary policy will indeed have persistent 
effects remains an open question. Economic theory provides 
ambiguous predictions. The theoretical literature primarily 
focuses on the potential for affirmative action to reduce 
inequality by incentivizing human capital accumulation for 
disadvantaged groups (e.g., Lundberg and Startz 1983). If 
employers perceive that some group of workers is less pro-
ductive or have more difficulty screening workers from that 
group, then the return to human capital investment for mem-
bers may be inefficiently dampened. In this setting, an affir-
mative action regulation can correct those incentives, and 
even a temporary program can permanently reduce inequal-
ity by eliminating negative stereotypes. However, Coate and 
Loury (1993) demonstrate this need not be the case; indeed, 
affirmative action can reduce the return to investment for that 
group even further. In this case, an affirmative action policy 
must be maintained permanently for any protected group 
gains to persist. In general, the consequences of a temporary 
affirmative action policy may depend on the setting.
In this chapter I study the dynamic effects of Executive 
Order 11246, the primary affirmative action regulation for 
employment in the United States. The regulation applies to 
firms that have sizable contracts or subcontracts with the 
federal government. The Department of Labor estimates that 
such firms employ about a quarter of the U.S. workforce 
(Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs 2013). 
Regulated firms are mandated to make a “good faith” effort 
to employ minorities at rates (at least) proportional to their 
shares of the local and qualified workforce. I study the 
regulation’s effect on the employment of black workers, one 
of the regulation’s original targets, the largest minority group 
over my period of study, and a group that is often the focus 
of affirmative action research (Holzer and Neumark 2000a). 
My work builds on the influential analysis of Leonard 
(1984), and the recent, careful, and closely related studies of 
the impacts of Executive Order 11246 on the employment 
and occupational advancement of women and minorities by 
Kurtulus (2011, 2012).
To estimate the dynamic effects of federal affirmative 
action regulation, I use an event study research design, 
exploiting variation in the timing of regulation and dereg-
ulation across work establishments. In particular, I utilize 
changes in employers’ status as a federal contractor using 
administrative data from 1978 to 2004. For many types of 
goods and services, the set of companies the government 
buys from at any given time is constantly changing. Turnover 
in these contractor relationships provides plausibly exoge-
nous variation in which and when employers are subject to 
affirmative action regulation.
I find that affirmative action sharply increases an estab-
lishment’s share of employees that are black, with the share 
continuing to increase over time. Five years after an estab-
lishment is first subject to the regulation, its share of employ-
ees that is black increased by an average of 0.8 percentage 
points. To put this magnitude in perspective, note that a 
0.8–1.3 percentage point increase in the share of the U.S. 
workforce that is black would eliminate the black-white job-
less gap over this period. This effect is proportionally larger 
for middle- and high-skill occupations.
Strikingly, I find that the share of employees that is black 
continues to grow even after an employer is deregulated. This 
persistence is evident more than a decade following deregu-
lation. By contrast, gaining and losing contractor status have 
symmetric associations with other employer characteristics. 
Establishment size increases when an establishment becomes 
a contractor, and decreases when it loses its contractor status. 
Moreover, following deregulation, an establishment’s like-
lihood of acquiring a new contract—and hence, becoming 
regulated again—quickly reverts to near the baseline rate.
This persistence is difficult to reconcile with existing 
economic models of affirmative action, which focus on the 
aforementioned human capital channel (Fang and Moro 
2011). In particular, because the policy variation exploited 
here varies across individual employers, it should have mini-
mal effects on the human capital investment incentives work-
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ers face in the broader labor market. Rather, any response is 
likely driven by changes at the employer level. 
Given that employers continue to increase the share of 
their workforce that is black even when they are deregu-
lated, a revealed preference argument would imply that it 
is profitable for them to do so. Consistent with this, I argue 
that the persistence found here is in part due to employers 
investing in what I term screening capital—investments that 
improve an employer’s ability to screen potential workers. 
Examples may include employing and training personnel 
specialists and departments, developing job tests, harnessing 
referral networks, developing relationships with and utilizing 
intermediaries such as employment agencies and schools, 
and even learning by doing or experimentation (Arrow 1962; 
Fryer and Jackson 2008).1
Building on the seminal Phelps (1972) model of statistical 
discrimination, I show how the persistence found here may 
be driven by affirmative action inducing employers to make 
(partially) irreversible investments to improve screening. In 
existing models, an employer can only comply with affirma-
tive action by reducing their hiring standard for the pro-
tected group. I introduce a novel response margin, allowing 
employer investments in screening capital. I show that, under 
conditions often assumed in the statistical discrimination 
literature, screening investments will reduce between-group 
disparities in hiring rates; moreover, affirmative action will 
increase the return to such investments. If these investments 
are at least partially irreversible, temporary affirmative action 
regulation can generate persistent changes in screening 
capital, and hence produce a durable increase in the minority 
share of hires.
I then present evidence supporting the model’s predic-
tions. First, the model predicts that regulation will increase 
the return to investments in screening. Using cross-sectional 
survey data, I show that regulated employers use more 
screening methods—including personnel specialists, job 
tests, credential checks, and intermediaries—than otherwise 
similar unregulated employers. These results largely echo 
those in Holzer and Neumark (2000b).
Second, the model predicts that screening investments 
will reduce between-group differences in hiring rates. To 
test this, I exploit another source of variation in screening 
investment: employer size. It is well documented that larger 
employers use more resources in screening and use a wider 
variety of methods (Marsden 1994). Using administrative 
panel data, I show that employers’ share of employees that 
is black is increasing in employer size. While previous work 
documents a positive cross-sectional correlation between 
employer size and share of employees that are black (Car-
rington, McCue, and Pierce 2000; Holzer 1998), it is not 
clear what drives this relationship. For example, the authors 
of these studies posit that the relationship may be driven by 
workplace discrimination law, which does not cover estab-
lishments with fewer than 15 employees, or the concentra-
tion of larger establishments in urban locations. To rule out 
these alternative explanations, I show that this relationship 
holds within-establishment and within-job (where jobs are 
defined as establishment by occupation cells) for a large 
sample of establishments that are all subject to workplace 
discrimination law.2
Given that employers continue to increase the share of 
their workforce that is black even when they are no longer 
regulated, a revealed preference argument would imply that 
it is profitable for them to do so. This suggests that affir-
mative action leads firms to take actions that increase the 
profitability of employing black workers. I provide evidence 
that these actions include screening investments. These 
investments might take several forms, and determining 
what types of capital are most significant for both compli-
ance and persistence requires further study. Alternatively, 
affirmative action may prompt employers to change their 
personnel practices in a way that is prohibitively costly to 
reverse. To distinguish between these classes of explana-
tions, one could measure the dynamic effects of affirmative 
action on productivity and profitability. More generally, the 
persistence documented in this chapter suggests that minority 
workers face job search frictions that can be at least partially 
surmounted by temporary intervention. Understanding the 
sources of these frictions and specific mechanisms that can 
mitigate these impediments remains an important area for 
future research.
Chapter 2
When Work Moves: Job Suburbanization and 
Black Employment
The second chapter introduces novel evidence on the 
spatial mismatch hypothesis. Since 1960, the unemploy-
ment rate in the United States for blacks has been roughly 
double the unemployment rate for whites (Fairlie and 
Sundstrom 1999). Large disparities remain after condition-
ing on measures of labor market skill, including education 
and Armed Forces Qualification Test scores (Ritter and 
Taylor 2011). The spatial mismatch hypothesis argues that 
this gap is in part attributable to the geographic distribution 
of employers and households. Black households tend to 
live relatively far from work opportunities, reducing their 
access to employment. In particular, while firms and white 
households relocated from the central city to the suburban 
ring at an accelerated rate following World War II—from 50 
percent of jobs and white residents in 1950 to 30 percent in 
1990 (Baum-Snow 2007)—black households faced initially 
strong barriers to suburban residence, including housing 
discrimination and liquidity constraints. As a result, they 
remained concentrated in the central city. Introduced by John 
Kain (1968), the spatial mismatch hypothesis and related 
ideas were further popularized by sociologist William Julius 
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Wilson in The Truly Disadvantaged (1987) and When Work 
Disappears (1996).
An extensive literature sets out to test the spatial mis-
match hypothesis, typically by relating labor market out-
comes to measures of job accessibility in a cross-section.3 
Most recent work in this literature finds some support for 
spatial mismatch, though results tend to be sensitive to how 
job accessibility is measured.4 More importantly, results from 
this literature are made difficult to interpret by the endogene-
ity of household and firm location. Across and within metro-
politan areas, residents who are (unobservably) less produc-
tive may sort into neighborhoods that are farther from work 
opportunities, where rents are typically lower.5 Similarly, 
firms may choose to locate in neighborhoods with residents 
who are (unobservably) more productive. In this chapter I 
test the spatial mismatch hypothesis over several decades 
while accounting for these endogenous location decisions.
In my analysis, I account for the endogeneity of house-
hold and firm locations in two steps. First, to account for 
household sorting I construct synthetic cohorts and estimate 
models in differences, exploiting variation in job suburban-
ization across metropolitan areas. In particular, I estimate 
models relating changes in cohort employment rates to 
changes in the spatial distribution of work. Surprisingly, 
panel methods have rarely been applied in this setting.6 
This approach has two advantages: 1) by conditioning on 
baseline employment, I absorb variation in time-invariant 
unobservable characteristics (as well as the effects of any 
initial spatial mismatch); and 2) it allows for households to 
sort across neighborhoods. Of course, with synthetic cohorts 
one concern is that endogenous migration may introduce 
compositional changes so that the relationship between job 
suburbanization and employment growth may in part reflect 
the changing composition of synthetic cohorts rather than 
within-person changes.7 Fortunately, I am able to test directly 
for endogenous migration responses and find that any com-
positional changes are negligible.
Using census data from 1970 and 2000, I find that job 
suburbanization is associated with significant relative 
declines in black employment. For every 10 percent decline 
in the fraction of MSA jobs located in the central city over 
this period, black employment rates declined by 1.4 to 2.1 
percent relative to white employment. Relative earnings 
declined by 1.1 to 2.3 percent. These relationships are not 
artifacts of selective migration, residential suburbanization, 
or changes in industry or occupation composition. Consis-
tent with the focus of the literature, this is a low-skill and 
middle-skill phenomenon; there is no relationship between 
job suburbanization and relative employment for blacks 
among college graduates. Notably, the estimates are driven 
almost entirely by job suburbanization that occurred during 
the 1970s. From 1970 to 1980, for every 10 percent decline 
in the fraction of MSA jobs located in the central city over 
this period, black relative employment rates declined by 
about 2.6 percent. From 1980 to 2000, such suburbanization 
is associated with only a 0.5–0.6 percent decline in black 
relative employment rates. Given the magnitude of the esti-
mates over the full period, this suggests that suburbanization 
occurring during the 1970s had a persistent effect.
Second, to account for the potential endogeneity of job 
suburbanization—in particular, changes in the spatial dis-
tribution of work driven by unobserved productivity shocks 
that are unevenly distributed across black and white labor—I 
exploit variation in job suburbanization that is plausibly 
exogenous to such productivity shocks. Specifically, I use 
variation in interstate highway construction across MSAs, 
as identified in Baum-Snow (2007). These highways were 
planned in the 1940s and 1950s, and hence their assignment 
across MSAs should be orthogonal to 1970s’ residual labor 
supply shocks. I show that they appear to be unrelated to 
demand shocks particular to black workers over this period. 
In addition, as in Baum-Snow (2007), I use a 1947 federal 
plan for the interstate highway system that was explic-
itly designed to link far away places rather than facilitate 
local commuting or economic development to instrument 
for actual highways constructed. I test whether the causal 
impacts of highways on the labor market are consistent with 
spatial mismatch; in particular, if highways increase job 
suburbanization and reduce relative employment for blacks. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first work to exploit 
variation in highway construction to test the spatial mismatch 
hypothesis.
Using exogenous variation in highway construction, I 
find that highways predict job suburbanization and declines 
in black relative employment in a manner consistent with 
spatial mismatch. While highways cause suburbanization 
that continues with each decade, the decrease in relative 
employment for blacks emerges during the 1970s and stag-
nates thereafter. This suggests that the estimated relationship 
between job suburbanization and black employment is causal 
and not driven by unobserved shocks to worker productivity. 
In addition, I find that highways cause residential suburban-
ization of white households but not black households over 
my period of study, consistent with the premise that black 
households faced significant additional barriers to suburban 
residence. Altogether, the results suggest that job suburban-
ization was an important determinant of black labor market 
outcomes over the 1970s, and that its initial impact persisted.
One additional concern with my approach is that if job 
suburbanization is driven by the relatively high exit of firms 
in the central city—which may disproportionately affect 
black workers, given that they tend to be concentrated in the 
central city—the estimated negative relationship between job 
suburbanization and black employment may simply reflect 
the effects of job displacement rather than the spatial distri-
bution of work per se. Using unique establishment data from 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, I show that 
this is unlikely to be the case.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Social Insurance with Heterogeneity
The third chapter, written with Isaiah Andrews, investi-
gates the implications of population heterogeneity for the 
sufficient statistic approach to welfare analysis developed in 
Baily (1978) and generalized in Chetty (2006). In a stylized 
model of unemployment, Baily obtains a simple formula for 
the optimal unemployment insurance (UI) benefit as a func-
tion of three parameters: 1) the elasticity of unemployment 
durations with respect to benefits, 2) the drop in consumption 
associated with unemployment as a function of UI benefits, 
and 3) the coefficient of relative risk aversion.8 This frame-
work has been applied extensively in both empirical and 
theoretical work on social insurance (e.g., Gruber 1997). 
One potential shortcoming of the Baily and Chetty results is 
that they are derived using models where agents are homo-
geneous along some important dimensions, while in practice 
heterogeneity seems likely to be empirically relevant. In the 
UI context, for example, there may be heterogeneity across 
agents in search costs; ability to smooth consumption (e.g., 
via borrowing, savings, or spousal labor supply); and local 
risk aversion. This heterogeneity can affect how individuals 
value UI, and the need to aggregate heterogeneous individual 
preferences may significantly complicate welfare analysis. 
As noted by Chetty (2006), the Baily-Chetty formulas 
are robust to a limited degree of heterogeneity, provided 
one plugs in appropriate population averages.9 This result, 
however, requires the assumption that agents share a com-
mon coefficient of relative risk aversion. This homogeneity 
assumption is used to relate differences in average utility 
across states to differences in average consumption. By con-
sidering the joint distribution of risk aversion and consump-
tion drops, we extend the Baily-Chetty framework to allow 
for arbitrary heterogeneity in risk preferences, and hence 
unrestricted heterogeneity across agents.
We show that several different approaches to calculating 
aggregate welfare for heterogeneous agents yield equivalent 
welfare metrics. We find that heterogeneity in risk aversion 
affects welfare analysis through the covariance between risk 
aversion and consumption drops in the cross-section of the 
unemployed. This reflects the fact that UI is more valuable if 
more risk-averse agents are subject to larger risks. We refer 
to this as the covariance effect.10 Our approach easily gen-
eralizes to accommodate a number of extensions, including 
UI systems with taxes and benefits that are proportional to 
wages. Further, we show that our results extend to a hetero-
geneous version of the rich dynamic model studied by Chetty 
(2006), allowing for a range of additional behaviors and 
constraints, including private insurance purchases and limits 
on borrowing.
To explore the potential importance of the covariance 
effect, we calibrate a stylized model of private consumption 
smoothing decisions using data on observed household con-
sumption drops associated with unemployment. The results 
suggest that the covariance effect may be large: for plausible 
population distributions of risk preferences, we find that 
accounting for the covariance effect can change the approxi-
mate consumption smoothing benefit of UI by more than 50 
percent.
Our results show that the value of social insurance 
depends on the extent to which risk exposure and risk toler-
ance are aligned in the unemployed population: for a given 
distribution of consumption drops, the lower the covariance 
of consumption drops faced by workers with individual risk 
aversion, the lower the value of additional social insurance. 
In contexts where risk aversion, ex ante risk, and ability 
to self-insure are largely independent, we would generally 
expect this covariance to be negative because more risk-
averse agents will take private actions to reduce their risk. 
Moreover, we would expect the magnitude of this effect to 
be larger when workers are better able to self-insure. To take 
an extreme example, even if most agents are quite risk averse 
and the average consumption drop associated with unem-
ployment is large, the marginal value of social insurance 
may be zero if all consumption risk is borne by a risk-neutral 
subpopulation, as could occur in the presence of actuarially 
fair private UI. However, without knowing the joint distri-
bution of risk preferences, ex ante risk, and ability to smooth 
consumption, the sign and magnitude of the covariance effect 
are a priori ambiguous and may depend on context; esti-
mating this covariance is an important challenge for future 
research.
References
Arrow, K. J. 1962. “The Economic Implications of Learning 
by Doing.” Review of Economic Studies 29(3): 155–173.
Baily, M. N. 1978. “Some Aspects of Optimal Unem-
ployment Insurance.” Journal of Public Economics 10: 
379–402.
Baum-Snow, N. 2007. “Did Highways Cause Suburbaniza-
tion?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(2): 775–805.
Carrington, W. J., K. McCue, and B. Pierce. 2000. “Using 
Establishment Size to Measure the Impact of Title VII and 
Affirmative Action.” Journal of Human Resources 35(3): 
503–523.
Chetty, R. 2006. “A General Formula for the Optimal Level 
of Social Insurance.” Journal of Public Economics 90: 
1879–1901.
Coate, S., and G. C. Loury. 1993. “Will Affirmative-Action 
Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?” American Eco-
nomic Review 83(5): 1220–1240.
Fairlie, R. W., and W. A. Sundstrom. 1999. “The Emergence, 
Persistence, and Recent Widening of the Racial Unemploy-
ment Gap.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 52(2): 
252–270.
Fang, H., and A. Moro. 2011. “Theories of Statistical 
2014 Dissertation Summaries 5
Discrimination and Affirmative Action.” In Handbook of 
Social Economics. Vol. 1A, J. Benhabib, M. Jackson, and 
A. Bisin, eds. Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 133–200.
Fryer, R. G., and M. O. Jackson. 2008. “A Categorical Model 
of Cognition and Biased Decision Making.” B.E. Journal 
of Theoretical Economics 8(1): 1–42.
Fryer, R. G., and G. C. Loury. 2013. “Valuing Diversity.” 
Journal of Political Economy 121(4): 747–774.
Gruber, J. 1997. “The Consumption Smoothing Benefits of 
Unemployment Insurance.” American Economic Review 
87(1): 192–205.
Holzer, H. 1998. “Why Do Small Establishments Hire Fewer 
Blacks Than Larger Ones?” Journal of Human Resources 
33(4): 896–914.
Holzer, H., and D. Neumark. 2000a. “Assessing Affirmative 
Action.” Journal of Economic Literature 38(3): 483–586.
———. 2000b. “What Does Affirmative Action Do?” Indus-
trial and Labor Relations Review 53(2): 240–271.
Ihlanfeldt, K. R., and D. L. Sjoquist. 1990. “Job Accessibility 
and Racial Differences in Youth Unemployment Rates.” 
American Economic Review 80: 267–276.
Kain, J. F. 1968. “Housing Segregation, Negro Employment 
and Metropolitan Decentralization.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 82(3): 175–197.
Kurtulus, F. A. 2011. “The Impact of Affirmative Action on 
the Employment of Minorities and Women over Three 
Decades: 1973–2003.” Unpublished manuscript.
———. 2012. “Affirmative Action and the Occupational 
Advancement of Minorities and Women during 1973–
2003.” Industrial Relations 51(2): 213–246.
Leonard, J. S. 1984. “The Impact of Affirmative Action on 
Employment.” Journal of Labor Economics 2(4): 439–463.
Lundberg, S. J., and R. Startz. 1983. “Private Discrimination 
and Social Intervention in a Competitive Labor Market.” 
American Economic Review 73(3): 340–347.
Marsden, P. V. 1994. “Selection Methods in US Establish-
ments.” Acta Sociologica 37(3): 287–301.
Mouw, T. 2000. “Job Relocation and the Racial Gap in 
Unemployment in Detroit and Chicago, 1980–1990: A 
Fixed-Effects Estimate of the Spatial Mismatch Hypothe-
sis.” American Sociological Review 65(5): 730–753.
Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs. 2013. 
Federal Contractor Compliance Manual. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance Programs.
Phelps, E. S. 1972. “The Statistical Theory of Racism and 
Sexism.” American Economic Review 62(4): 659–661.
Raphael, S. 1998. “The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis and 
Black Youth Joblessness: Evidence from the San Francisco 
Bay Area.” Journal of Urban Economics 43(1): 79–111.
Ritter, J. A., and L. J. Taylor. 2011. “Racial Disparity in 
Unemployment.” Review of Economics and Statistics 
93(1): 30–42.
Sowell, T. 2004. Affirmative Action Around the World: An 
Empirical Study. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Weinberg, B. A. 2004. “Testing the Spatial Mismatch 
Hypothesis Using Inter-City Variations in Industrial Com-
position.” Regional Science and Urban Economics 34(5): 
505–532.
Wilson, W. J. 1987. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner 
City, the Underclass and Public Policy. Chicago, IL: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
———. 1996. When Work Disappears: The World of the 
New Urban Poor. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Notes
 1. For example, suppose an employer learns to screen from a 
particular group by hiring members and learning what charac-
teristics predict productivity. Then one can view that initial set 
of hires as an investment to improve later screening.
 2. Still, it is possible that larger establishments hire more black 
workers primarily because of increased legal or public pres-
sure. In the chapter, I provide additional evidence against this 
alternative explanation.
 3. These analyses are conducted at various levels of aggregation. 
For example, these correlations are measured at the individual 
level by Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist (1990), at the neighborhood 
level by Raphael (1998), and at the metropolitan level by 
Weinberg (2004).
 4. For example, previous researchers have used the local job 
density, local job growth, and the average commuting times of 
local workers as measures of job accessibility.
 5. Alternatively, if spatial frictions are relevant, residents who 
find it difficult to obtain work may sort into neighborhoods 
with higher employment density.
 6. One exception is Mouw (2000), who estimates a first differ-
ences model at the neighborhood level. His estimates remain 
difficult to interpret because he does not account for endoge-
nous migration across neighborhoods.
 7. For example, productive black households may move out of an 
MSA following widespread suburbanization, leaving less-pro-
ductive black households behind.
 8. Chetty (2006) generalizes the intuition behind Baily’s stylized 
model, demonstrating that with minor adjustments, the Baily 
formula holds in a more general setting that allows for a large 
class of realistic extensions, including arbitrary borrowing 
constraints, leisure benefits of unemployment, and endogenous 
asset accumulation or human capital investment.
 9. Chetty (2006, Note 8, p. 1894). 
 10. As in Chetty (2006), although the model here refers to unem-
ployment shocks the same model can be applied to other types 
of social insurance by relabeling the shock (e.g., injury or 
disability).
